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AN OFFER THEY CAN'T REFUSE:
RACIAL DISPARITY IN JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE MEET ALTERNATIVES
THAT WORK*
Edgar Cahn** and Cynthia Robbins***
INTRODUCTION

While young people of all races commit delinquent acts, some are provided
treatment while others are detained and incarcerated. Once incarcerated, these
youth begin their slide down a slippery slope; they lack an equal opportunity to
gather evidence and prepare their cases. Furthermore, they will be effectively
deprived of the opportunity and the resources to develop the educational and
employment skills necessary to progress to productive adult lives. It is well documented that juveniles of color are more likely than their white counterparts to be
arrested,1 referred to juvenile court rather than to diversion programs, charged,
*

This article lays out a legal theory and a strategy developed as part of the Racial Justice

Initiative of TimeBanks USA funded in substantial part by the W. K. Kellogg Foundation. Additional
support for this research was provided by Ashoka Innovators for the Public and by the UDC David
A. Clarke School of Law. The authors extend our heartfelt appreciation for substantive contributions,
editorial insights, and feedback from our colleagues: Perry Moriearty, Clinical Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School; Mark Soler, Executive Director, Center for Children's Law and
Policy; Professors Thomas Mack, William McLain, Joseph Tulman, UDC David A. Clarke School of
Law; Helen Frazer, Public Services Director, Library of the UDC David A. Clarke School of Law;
Keri A. Nash, Associate for Legal Research & Outreach, TimeBanks USA - Racial Justice Initiative;
and, Christine Gray, Executive Director, TimeBanks USA. We are particularly indebted to Joy
Aceves-Amaya, law student, UDC David A. Clarke School of Law, for her steadfast and painstaking
editorial support.
** Distinguished Emeritus Professor of Law, UDC David A. Clarke School of Law; CoFounder & Co-Dean, Antioch School of Law; Co-Founder, OEO Legal Services Program; Founder,
TimeBanks USA (TBUSA); Co-Director, TBUSA Racial Justice Initiative; Founder, Time Dollar
Youth Court; Distinguished Visitor, London School of Economics; Ph.D., Yale University; J.D., Yale
Law School; M.A., Yale University; B.A., Swarthmore College.
*** Consultant, Nonprofit Organizational Development, Philanthropy, and Education; Co-Director, TBUSA Racial Justice Initiative; Former Executive Director, See Forever/Maya Angelou
School; Former Staff Attorney and Board Chair, District of Columbia Public Defender Service; Former Senior Program Officer, Eugene and Agnes E. Meyer Foundation; Founding Director, Public
Counsel's Urban Recovery Legal Assistance; Board Member, Phelps Stokes Fund; Co-Founder, East
Palo Alto Community Law Project; J.D., Stanford Law School; A.B., Harvard University.
1 We use the term "youth of color" throughout this article primarily to refer to African American and Latino youth. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention ("OJJDP") defines
minority populations - youth of color - as African Americans, American Indians, Asians, Pacific
Islanders, and Hispanics. OJJDP Substantive Requirements for Grant Programs, 28 C.F.R.
§ 31.3036)(6) (2009).
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waived to adult court, detained pre-trial, and locked up at disposition. 2 What
recent studies have shown, however, is that these disparate outcomes are not
solely the product of race neutral factors. Multi-regression research that controls
for other causal variables has revealed a statistically significant "race effect" on
decision-making at multiple points in juvenile justice courts and administrations
across the nation. There is incontrovertible evidence that race bias affects critical
decisions leading to detention or confinement. The consequences of this disparate
treatment can be devastating to juveniles of color and any community aspiring to
make good on the guarantee of equal justice.3
Efforts to address these disparities have thus far produced little more than a
'multi-million dollar cottage industry whose primary activity is to restate the
problem of disparities, in essence, endlessly adoring the question of what to do
2 NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT OF YOUTH OF COLOR IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2007), http://www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/
pubs/2007jan-justice-for some.pdf [hereinafter AND JUSTICE FOR SOME]. From 2002 to 2004, African
Americans comprised 16% of all youth; 28% of juvenile arrests; 30% of referrals to juvenile court;
37% of the detained population; 34% of youth formally processed by the juvenile court; 30% of
adjudicated youth; 35% of youth judicially waived to adult criminal court; 38% of youth in residential
placement; and 58% of youth admitted to state adult prison. Id. Over the last thirty years, multiple
studies have shown that disproportionate minority contact ("DMC") afflicts nearly every processing
point in nearly every juvenile justice system in the country. Perry Moriearty, Combating the ColorCoded Confinement of Kids: An Equal Protection Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 285,

310 (2008). From the mid-1980's to 1995, the number of white youth in detention decreased, while the
detention of minorities increased until they represented a majority of detained young people. BARRY
HOLMAN ET AL., JUSTICE POLICY INST., DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATING
YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE FACILITIES 12, (2007) [hereinafter DANGERS OF DETENTION]. In 1985, 43% of juvenile detainees nationwide were youth of color; in 1995, that percentage

grew to 56% and 62% in 1999. In 2006, in the most recent national count taken, the percentage of
youth of color detainees rose to 69%. RICHARD A. MENDEL, THE ANNE E. CASEY FOUND., TWO
DECADES OF JDAI, A PROGRESS REPORT - DRAFT 5, (2009) [hereinafter Two DECADES OF JDAI].
However, in 2007, African American juveniles accounted for only 16.3% of the population nationwide, Asian-Americans accounted for 4.8% of the population, Native Americans accounted for 1.2%,
and self-identified Hispanics accounted for 20.9%. C. PUZZANCHERA, ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, EASY ACCESS TO JUVENILE POPULATIONS: 1990-2007 (2008),
http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/ezapop/.

3 Michael J. Leiber, DisproportionateMinority Confinement of Youth: An Analysis of State and
FederalEfforts to Address the Issue, 48(1) CRIME & DELINQ. 11-14 & app. D (2002) (noting that 32 of
46 studies conducted by 40 different states reported "race effects," defined as "the presence of a
statistically significant race relationship with a case outcome that remains once controls for legal factors have been considered"); Carl E. Pope et al., DisproportionateMinority Confinement. A Review of
the Research Literature from 1989 Through 2001, OJJDP Juv. JUST. BULL. 5, http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/
dmc/pdf/dmc89_01.pdf (noting that 25 of 34 studies reviewed reported "race effects" in the processing
of youth). By 1997, in thirty states - representing 83% of the national population - minority youth
comprised the majority of youth in detention. DANGERS OF DETENTION, supra note 2, at 12. Even in
states with minuscule ethnic and racial minority populations, more than fifty percent of the youth
detained were minorities. Id. Additionally, a study by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Programs ("OJJDP") found that in 49 states the numbers of detained minority youth exceeded their
proportion of the nation's population. Id.
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about disproportionate minority contact ("DMC"), but never reaching an answer. 4 In 1992 and again in 2002, in its reauthorization of the Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act ("JJDPA" or "the Act"), Congress was explicitly concerned about DMC and elevated the mandate to reduce DMC to a core
requirement of the Act. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Protection ("OJJDP") has launched a technical assistance website and database and
funneled millions of dollars to states to study and reform their local juvenile justice systems.5 There have been numerous conferences, meetings, and studies.
States have added DMC specialist staff positions. And yet, despite this long-term
and substantial investment of governmental resources, the bottom line is that
there has been virtually no reduction in DMC in most jurisdictions.
For decades, despite the persuasive data documenting DMC, the efforts to dismantle structural racism stemming from the systemic polices and practices of government agencies has been thwarted by the requirement for injured parties to
prove discriminatory intent set forth in Washington v. Davis6 and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,7 then reaffirmed by
McCleskey v. Kemp. 8 When it comes to a municipality or an agency, intent to
discriminate is virtually impossible to prove. 9 However, in City of Canton v. Harris, the Supreme Court provided one explicit test that results in a finding of municipal intent and liability. 10 Intent can be inferred when government
4

JAMES BELL ET AL.,

W.

HAYWOOD BURNS INST., ADORATION OF THE QUESTION: REFLEC-

TION ON THE FAILURE TO REDUCE RACIAL

& ETHNIC

DISPARITIES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

15 (2008). The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act ("JJDPA") originally provided that
"DMC" was an acronym for "Disproportionate Minority Confinement," which occurs when the percentage of minority youth confined in the juvenile justice system facilities exceeds their proportion in
the general population. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (1988). In 2002, Congress expanded the concept of
DMC to include any point of "contact" with the juvenile justice system at which minority youth are
overrepresented. See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (2006). The acronym "DMC" now commonly refers to
"Disproportionate Minority Contact." Id.
5 See Development Services Group, Inc., http://www.dsgonline.com/index.html (last visited
Mar. 10, 2009) [hereinafter DSG Website].
6 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
7 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) ("Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis made it clear that official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact. Disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination."). Proof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
8 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987).
9 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2107 (2002); Serena A. Hoy, Interpreting
Equal Protection: Congress, The Courts and The Civil Rights Acts, 16 J. L. & POL. 381, 417 (2000);
Charles Lawrence, The Id, The Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317, 355 (1987).
10 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (finding that a failure to provide training
for police officers in the use of deadly force was reckless or grossly negligent because it could be
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policymakers "where - and only where - a deliberate choice to follow a course of
action is made from among various alternatives" by city policymakers.""
This Article applies the Supreme Court's "deliberate indifference" test in a
new context - enforcement of equal protection rights - to address the problem of
disproportionate minority contact in the juvenile justice system.' 2 The juvenile
justice system continues to subject youth of color to the high risks of injury from
decisions regarding detention and confinement that manifest a racial bias. 3
Those decisions demonstrate "deliberate indifference" when decision-makers are
on formal notice of preferable, more effective, less costly, and less injurious alternatives. This pattern of practices, if maintained, violates constitutional rights and
14
gives rise to a valid claim for damages, declaratory, and injunctive relief.
This Article also proposes a system change strategy that envisions the use of
litigation as the last step and a last resort. We urge tactical reliance upon the use
of other forums and processes to engage officials and enlist public support for
these more efficacious -alternatives. To establish the requisite "deliberate indifference" in the juvenile justice context, we posit the need for a process to put officials on formal notice that:
(1) the present system results in documented disproportionate minority
contact that violates the United States Constitution if the requisite dis-

criminatory intent or purpose is shown;
anticipated - with substantial certainty - that the lack of training would deprive persons' of their
constitutional rights).
11 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 (citing Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986));
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
12 Although we developed this analysis in the juvenile justice context, our proposed strategy
might also be applicable in other areas, such as child welfare and special education.
13 The administration of juvenile justice varies by jurisdiction in regard to the number of players, their respective roles, and who bears decision-making authority for such aspects as diversion,
charging, and detention. These varied players include, among others: police officers, prosecutors, probation departments, court social services departments, youth services departments, and schools. Accordingly, system change strategies must be tailored to reflect the readiness, resources, and roles in
each particular jurisdiction under review. This article is designed to set in motion the dynamics necessary to effectuate system change by providing a strategy to overcome the historic "discriminatory
intent" barrier to successful litigation.
14 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except
that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
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(2) this disparity cannot be accounted for by purely racially neutral
15
factors;
(3) injuries flow from this disparity, specifically from the disproportionately
high detention rate for youth of color;16 and
(4) highly effective, replicated, and less costly alternatives would substantially reduce disproportionate minority contact and these methods have

been made known to official decision-makers and have not been
utilized.
When official decision-makers have had formal notice of alternatives that are less
costly and yield significant, sustained effects that have been replicated or have

earned designation as promising or exemplary, the failure to use these alternatives would constitute "intentional disregard" of injury to the fundamental constitutional rights for youth of color in the juvenile justice system.' 7
Officials have an obligation to make use of knowledge where existing practices
have a disproportionately injurious impact on youth of color. Part I of this Article
provides a truncated summary of the extent to which DMC pervades the juvenile

justice system and violates a youth's constitutional right to equal protection; it
15 We make this assertion because youth who are white and commit the same offenses as youth
of color are treated differently and alternatives known to officials have been more frequently utilized
for white youth. These available alternatives are more effective and less expensive than present practice. These alternatives have been formally recognized and recommended by authoritative sources.
16 Although DMC manifests at all key milestones of the juvenile process, this article focuses on
the decision points that result in confinement because the detention decision is pivotal to eventual
outcomes for any juvenile who finds him or herself behind bars. "More than fifteen years of experience suggests that changing practices and procedures to bring greater rationality to the use of juvenile
detention could be an important component in efforts to reduce disparity." CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM, UNDERSTANDING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY IN CHILD WELFARE AND JUVENILE

A COMPENDIUM, 29 (2009); see also Moriearty, supra note 2, at 291. We use the word "detention" to refer to two distinct practices: secure pre-adjudication detention and secure confinement
post-adjudication.

JUsTICE:

Secure detention refers to the holding of youth, upon arrest, in a juvenile detention facility
(e.g., juvenile hall) for two main purposes: to ensure the youth appears for all court hearings
and to protect the community from future offending. In contrast, secure confinement refers
to youth who have been adjudicated delinquent and are committed to the custody of correctional facilities for periods generally ranging from a few months to several years.
See infra Austin, note 43, at 1.
17 ROBIN L. DAHLBERG, ACLU RACIAL JUST. PROJECT, LOCKING UP OUR CHILDREN: THE
SECURE DETENTION OF MASSACHUSETTS YOUTH AFTER ARRAIGNMENT AND BEFORE ADJUDICATION (2008).
In 2006, it cost Massachusetts taxpayers approximately $15,000 to detain a child for 16 days
(the average length of stay) in one of DYS's facilities. At the same time, it costs less than
$1500 to provide a child who was permitted to remain at home with 6 to 8 weeks of supervision to ensure that he returned to court and didn't re-offend.

UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

thereby gives dimension to the scale of the injury inflicted. 18 Excessive use of
detention may also give rise to a Due Process claim that is equally injurious to all
youth - white as well as youth of color. 19 However, the central purpose of this
Article is to propose a way to meet the "intent" requirement under the Equal
Protection Clause by providing a structured opportunity for officials to choose
cost-effective alternatives that would reduce DMC instead of relying on the ineffective and racially disproportionate option of incarceration.
Part II analyzes how using "deliberate indifference" as the gravamen of a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 addresses the intent requirement that has operated
as a barrier to relief in the past. Part III describes the extensive body of knowledge which has emerged over the past few decades and which, if used, would save
vast amounts of money, reduce DMC, and mitigate its most injurious manifestation - the disproportionate use of detention and confinement of minority youth.
It also describes two highly successful alternatives to secure confinement with
which the authors have experience that illustrate how readily beneficial and cost
effective system change could be initiated. One involves diversion prior to adjudication; the other offers a highly effective alternative to confinement, used both
pre- and post-adjudication, that has proven effective for over thirty years.
Part IV discusses how courts deal with public interest litigation designed to
effect system change. Instead of focusing the search for proof of intent on past
actions and practice, we propose to shift the focus to include future actions taken
following a proffer of alternatives. Thus, the relevant officials in the juvenile justice system need to be given a prospective choice to use alternatives to detention
that have proven to be effective, including initial diversion. If these officials persist in continuing a present practice of disproportionate incarceration, they will
have manifested the requisite "deliberate indifference."
I.

WHAT COLOR IS JUVENILE JUSTICE?

Since the turn of the last century, a separate system of juvenile justice has
developed in the United States that is expressly designed to serve the "best interests of the child" and to rehabilitate any young person who has erred in judgment
and conduct. 20 It should not matter what color young people are if they misbe18 See Appendix A: Two Roads Diverge - Parallel Tales. Appendix A provides a typical scenario describing how such disparities manifest in a relatively routine case.
19 The Supreme Court has severely circumscribed the liberty interest of juveniles. See Schall v.
Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (noting that children are assumed to be subject to control of their parents
and that if parental control falters, "the juvenile's liberty interest may be subordinated to the state's
parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting welfare of the child") (quoting Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)). Accordingly, we have focused exclusively on the violation of Equal
Protection rather than on denial of Due Process.
20 The first separate juvenile court was created by the enactment of the Illinois Juvenile Court
Act of 1899. In response to the Reformist movement of the late nineteenth century, the Illinois legislature created a rehabilitative system for the adjudication of youth under the age of sixteen in order to
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have or commit acts that would be crimes if they were adults. All too often, how-

ever, the color of a young person's skin defines the experience he or she will have
in the juvenile justice system. 2 1 A cascading series of decisions throughout the
juvenile justice process can determine whether resources are spent on rehabilitation, as called for and supported by the JJDPA,22 or whether a single bad act

places a youth on a path that will irrevocably
delimit his future as a life journey
23
down the "cradle to prison pipeline.,
A.

Equal Justice is the Casualty of DisproportionateMinority Contact

[F]airly viewed, pretrial detention of a juvenile gives rise to injuries
compa24
rable to those associated with the imprisonment of an adult.

Removing young people from their communities and dropping them into secure detention halts their development while causing many long-term injurious
consequences that amount to anything but rehabilitation. Too often, youth of
color get locked up; their development is suspended much like the fossilized insect frozen in petrified amber - stuck. Recent brain development research indicates that under ordinary circumstances, mature decision-making capacity may
not develop until the age of twenty, or even later in some instances.2 5 Many

young people who have been incarcerated and returned to the community beseparate juveniles from the social stigma and procedural formalities associated with the adult criminal
process. Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., The Juvenile Court at 100 Years: A Look Back, in Juv. JUST. J. 13
(1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/jjjournal1299/2.html. Because the guiding principle for creation of the first juvenile court was "[a] child should be treated as a child," it was unacceptable that children under the age of 16 would be prosecuted and incarcerated in prisons "before they
knew what a crime was." Ann Reyes Robbins, Troubled Children and Children in Trouble: Redefining
the Role of the Juvenile Court in the Lives of Children, 41 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 243 (2007).
21 See Appendix: Two Roads Diverge - Parallel Tales; which mimics real life when tracing the
fictional, but typical the fates of two young men. Ian, a Caucasian, and Tyrone, an African-American,
both teenagers who commit virtually identical incidents that result in vastly different outcomes.
22 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5784 (2002). The purpose of the JJDPA is to support state and local programs to prevent juvenile involvement in delinquent behavior, promote public safety by encouraging
juvenile accountability, and to provide technical assistance and information on programs to combat
juvenile delinquency.
23 THE CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, AMERICA'S CRADLE TO PRISON PIPELINE 5 (2007), available at http://www.childrensdefense.org/child-research-data-publications/data/cradle-prison-pipelinereport-2007-full-highres.pdf. In 2007, The Children's Defense Fund launched an initiative, the Cradle
to Prison Pipeline TM Campaign, to address and interrupt this apparent pipeline for young people,
particularly low income youth of color. Id. The organization's vision calls for a paradigm shift in the
juvenile system's current focus on punishment and incarceration to one focused on investment, prevention, and intervention in the lives of all young people. Id.
24 Schall, 467 U.S. at 291 (Marshall J., dissenting). As the juvenile court developed to incorporate more due process protections per In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966), and other cases, the more
confrontational process has also resulted in disproportionate outcomes.
25 Elizabeth Cauffman et al., (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May
Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 741, 756 (2000).
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come unable to break out of behaviors that they might have otherwise outgrown
as adults.

26

Adolescent antics are a predictable developmental byproduct of youth.2 7 As

teenagers mature they grow less inclined to act out.28 This is particularly true
when youth live in the community with access to support from family or surrogate supervision, wrap-around and enrichment programming, mentors, role models, school, and employers. 29 Most youth desist from delinquent behavior once

they have achieved educational and employment milestones. 30 Detention often
arrests a youth's developmental process; detention propels a youth in a different
direction, as evidenced by recidivism rates of 50% to 80% for youth who have
been incarcerated. 3 1 Adolescents are very suggestible, seeking a sense of belonging, confidence, and competency. When incarcerated in close proximity to other
delinquent youth, their environment promotes the development of antisocial be26 Id. at 7. (noting that incarceration interrupts and delays a youth's normal pattern of discontinuing delinquent behavior as they mature due to its effect on community, education, and employment engagements); see generally ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING
JUVENILE JUSTICE (Harvard Univ. Press 2008).
27

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
ch. 3 (2000), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/youthviolence/ [hereinafter
YOUTH VIOLENCE]. As many as one-third of youth exhibit delinquent behaviors; however, most will
naturally outgrow such actions as they attain maturity. DANGERS OF DETENTION, supra note 2, at 6.
"According to Dr. Delbert Elliott, former President of the American Society of Criminology and
head of the Center for the Study of the Prevention of Violence, although the rate of delinquent
behavior appears high, the rate at which the criminal behavior ceases is also high." Id.
GENERAL,

28
29

YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 27; DANGERS OF DETENTION, supra note 2, at 6.

DANGERS OF DETENTION, supra note 2, at 6.

30 Id. Studies show that youth able to establish a relationship with a partner or mentor, as well
as obtain employment, correlates with the ability of youthful offenders to cease delinquent behavior.
31 According to the Annie E. Casey Foundation,
In fact, recidivism studies routinely show that 50 to 80 percent of youth released from juvenile correctional facilities are rearrested within 2 to 3 years - even those who were not serious offenders prior to their commitment. Half or more of all released youth are later reincarcerated in juvenile or adult correctional facilities. Meanwhile, correctional confinement
typically costs $200 to $300 per youth per day, far more than even the most intensive homeand community-based treatment models. Research shows that youth who spend time in custody are less likely to complete high school, less likely to avoid re-arrest, less likely to find
employment, and less likely to form stable families. They are also more likely to abuse drugs
and alcohol.

E. CASEY FOUND., 2008 KIDS COUNT ESSAY: A ROAD MAP FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM 9
(2008) [hereinafter ROAD MAP FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE]. "Youth who are detained are more than
three times as likely to be found guilty and incarcerated than similarly situated peers." Two Decades
of JDAI, supra note 2, at 5. When comparing likelihood of behavior, youth who have been detained
or incarcerated have a 49% chance of using alcohol, 42% chance of using any illicit drug, and a 59%
chance of dropping out of high school. Id. By comparison, youth who have not been detained or
incarcerated, have a 34% chance of using alcohol, 21% chance of using any illicit drug, and a 30%
chance of dropping out of high school. Id.
ANNIE
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havior among teenagers
seeking both competency in illicit behavior and accept32
peers.
their
by
ance
In 2006, the Department of Justice reported that 96,655 juveniles were incarcerated in youth detention centers.3 3 African American youth constitute 16% of

U.S. youth but 38% of the youth in detention. 34 In many states, the disparity is
even greater. 35 Minorities are more likely than whites to be formally charged in

juvenile court and to be sentenced to out-of-home placement, even when referred
for the same offense.36
Today, Latin, Native, Asian, Pacific Islanders and African Americans are 35%

of the U.S. youth population, yet comprise 65% of all youth who are securely
detained pre-adjudication. 37 Youth of color are four times more likely to be arrested for a drug trafficking offense, 38 even though white teens self-reported ex-

periences of using and selling drugs at rates greater than African American
teens. 39 The length of incarceration compounds both the disparity and the injury

inflicted; on average, African American and Latino juveniles are confined, respectively, 61 and 112 days longer than white youth.4 0 Additionally, minorities

account for more than 58% of youth admitted to state adult prisons.4 1 Although
this Article does not address in detail the disproportionate rate of referral to
32 Thomas J. Dishion, et al., When Interventions Harm: Peer Groups and Problem Behavior, 54
AM. PSYCHOL. 755-64 (Sept. 1999).
33 HOWARD N. SNYDER ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 211 (2006).
34

Id. at 2.

35

Id. at 213.

36

AND JUSTICE FOR SOME, supra note 2, at 2.

37

Eleanor Hynton Hoytt et al., Reducing Racial Disparitiesin Juvenile Detention, in 8 Annie E.

CASEY FOUND. PATHWAYS TO JUVENILE DETENTION REFORM 18 (2001).

38 SNYDER, supra note 33, at 211. In 2003, 79% of the youth incarcerated for drug trafficking
offenses were minorities, compared to 21% for white youth. Id. During this period, 73% of adjudicated drug offenses involved a white youth; white youth comprised 58% of the offenders receiving
out-of-home placement and 75% of those receiving formal probation. Id. Contrastingly, 25% of the
adjudicated drug offense cases involved an African-American youth; African-American youth comprised 40% of the offenders receiving out-of-home placements and 22% of those receiving formal
probation. Id.
39 Carl McCurley et al., Co-Occurrence of Substance Use Behaviorsin Youth, JUv. JUST. BULL.,
4 (Nov. 2008), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/219239.pdf. The 1997 Longitudinal Survey of
Youth indicates that white and Hispanic youth were "more likely than African American youth to
report ... substance-related behavior (twenty-nine, twenty-six, and nineteen percent, respectively)."
Id. Additionally, "whites and Hispanics were more likely than African American youth to report
drinking alcohol [and] whites were more likely than African Americans to report either marijuana use
or selling drugs." Id.
40

ALEX PIQUERO, DisproportionateMinority Contact, 18 FUTURE OF CHILD. 59, 62 (Fall 2008),

available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content-storage-01/0000019b/80/41/
92/3a.pdf.
41

Id. at 63.
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adult court, this decision offers one of the most predictably high rates of disparity
with some of the most gravely injurious consequences.
The systematic failure of many state and local authorities to collect data by
race stymies efforts to fully document, explain, and address disproportionality.4 2
Nonetheless, the information that does exist strongly suggests that racial bias accounts for disproportionate treatment at each stage of the juvenile delinquency
process and that its consequences are severe in regard to decisions concerning
juvenile incarceration, pre- and post-adjudication.
B.

Collateral Consequences of Confinement

Incarcerated youth typically do not receive the education or the healthcare
which would have been available to them had they been sent home under supervision. Correctional systems have been the dumping ground for children with
mental health, substance abuse, family-related, and behavioral problems - along
with those suffering undiagnosed and untreated developmental disabilities.4 3
Studies estimate that as many as 70% of incarcerated youth have diagnosable
mental health problems. 4
The legal collateral consequences that result from juvenile incarceration have
been dubbed "invisible punishment" by Jeremy Travis, former director of the National Institute of Justice. 45 These consequences increasingly and disproportionately harm the life options for youth of color. 4 6 For anyone convicted of a felony
drug offense, collateral consequences include lifetime bans on the receipt of federal benefits, such as food stamps and other types of public assistance. 47 For anyone convicted of a drug related offense or activity, collateral consequences
include denial of public housing and student loans.4 8 Disproportionately high
rates of conviction and incarceration of juveniles of color for drug related of42

DAHLBERG, supra note 17, at 5.

43 Joseph J. Cocozzo & Kathleen Skowyra, Youth with Mental Health Disorders: Issues and
Emerging Responses, 7 JUV. JUST. J., 4-5 (Apr. 2000), http://www.ncmhjj.com/pdfs/publications/
YouthwithMentalHealthDisorders.pdf.
44 James Austin et al., Alternatives to the Secure Detention and Confinement o fJuvenile Offenders, ODJJP Juv. JUST. BULL. 2 (Sept. 2005), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/208804.pdf. "Between 50 and 70 percent of incarcerated youth have a diagnosable mental illness and up to 19 percent
may be suicidal, yet timely treatment is difficult to access in crowded facilities." Id. See also Linda A.
Teplin, Assessing Alcohol, Drug, and Mental Disorders in Juvenile Detainees, ODJJP FACT SHEET
(Jan. 2001), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/fs200lO2.pdf.
45

See JEREMY TRAVIS, INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS

IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer et al. eds. 2002).
46 Marc Mauer, Invisible Punishment: Block Housing, Education, Voting, Focus MAG., May/

Jun. 2003, at 3, 4.
47 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104193, § 115, 110 Stat. 2180 (1996).
48 Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-276, § 576 (1998) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 13661 (2006)); Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2006).
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fenses drastically diminish their ability to participate in their communities after
they are released.4 9 Confinement in juvenile facilities represents a significant separation from the communities to which these youth return. Substantial obstacles
must be overcome upon release from confinement, such as re-entry to public
50
schools, obtaining marketable skills, and finding employment opportunities.
To illustrate the decision points in the juvenile justice process from which disparate outcomes emerge, the Appendix provides contrasting fictional, but typical,
scenarios for two sixteen-year-old males, one Caucasian and the other African
American. Both teenagers are involved in a fight at their respective neighborhood high schools where most people are of the same race as the young man in
the altercation. By design, the initial incidents are virtually identical but the consequences are as different as black and white.
H.

DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE: REFRAMING DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY
CONTACT FOR A

§ 1983

COMPLAINT

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act ("JJDPA" or the "Act")
is designed to provide the resources, leadership, and coordination necessary to
develop and conduct effective programs that prevent delinquency, divert
juveniles from the traditional juvenile justice system, and provide critically
needed alternatives to the institutionalization of youth. 51 Four core protections of
the Act are explicit: (1) deinstitutionalizing status offenders; (2) separating juvenile and adult offenders in secure confinement; (3) eliminating the practice of
detaining or confining juveniles in adult jails and lockups; and (4) addressing the
disproportionately large number of minority youth who come into contact with
the juvenile justice system. And, the JJDPA provides states with the funds and
expertise they need to meet these goals.52
Earlier court decisions have found an implicit private right of action in three of
these JJDPA protections - not jailing status offenders, separating adult and juvenile offenders, and ceasing to confine juveniles in adult jails. 5 3 However, the policy mandate to address disproportionate minority contact ("DMC") simply
means that the states must submit a plan that addresses DMC. The JJDPA does
not set numerical standards and does not require states to adopt measures known
49 Dep't. of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (holding that federal AntiDrug Abuse Act required lease terms that gave local public housing authorities the discretion to
terminate the lease of a tenant when a member of the household or a guest engaged in drug-related
activity, regardless of whether tenant knew, or should have known, of the drug-related activity). "On
a given day, African Americans comprise nearly half of all youth in the United States detained for a
drug offense." DANGERS OF DETENTION, supra note 2, at 13.
50 Tamara A. Steckler, Litigating Racism: Exposing Injustice In Juvenile Prosecutions, 60
RUTGERS L. REv. 245, 258 (2007).
51 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5602(b) (2000).
52 Cruz v. Collazo, No. 77-83084, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8941, at 13 (D.P.R. Oct. 26, 1979).
53 Hendrickson v. Griggs, 672 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (N.D. Iowa 1987).
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to be effective. Such requirements could be added through amendments or
through the regulations governing state plan requirements. 54 To be enforceable,

however, an express private right of action likely is necessary in light of two Supreme Court decisions: Alexander v. Sandoval55 and Gonzaga University v.
Doe.56 While an action in mandamus might lie to secure effective enforcement, it
is not likely to succeed until Congress amends the JJDPA provisions governing
core DMC measures in a manner that makes the requirements, consequences,
and enforcement processes far more specific.57 At present, all a state must show
58
is that it is addressing the DMC problem.
This Article proposes that the community of people concerned about juvenile
justice reform and reducing DMC need not and should not wait idly, hoping the
next Congressional re-authorization mandates more effective enforcement.5 9
Historically, federal agencies have been extremely reluctant to withhold funds
from states even in the face of egregious violations. These agencies regard funding cut-offs as the equivalent of using a nuclear bomb and, in deference to federalism, are often leery of acting. It is possible that this reluctance also is being
54 On March 24, 2009, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Reauthorization Act of 2009. Press Release, Office of Senator Leahy, Leahy Introduces
Juvenile Justice Reauthorization Bill (Mar. 24, 2009), http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200903/
023409b.html. This Act will strengthen provisions related to the disproportionate minority contact
core requirement by requirement by providing additional direction for states and localities on how to
identify and reduce racial and ethnic disparities among youth who come into contact with the juvenile
justice system. Id. In addition, state juvenile justice system plans must provide alternatives to detention that include diversion to home-based detention or community-based services for youth in need of
treatment for mental health, substance abuse, or co-occurring disorders. Id. States must also include
plans to: reduce the number of children housed in secure detention facilities who are awaiting placement in residential treatment programs; encourage inclusion of family members in the design and
delivery of juvenile delinquency prevention and treatment services - particularly, post-placement; and
use community-based services for addressing needs of at-risk youth and those who have come into
contact with the juvenile justice system. Id.
55 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that no freestanding private right of
action exists to enforce disparate impact Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
56 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
57 See supra note 53.
58

JAMES BELL ET AL., W. HAYWOOD BURNS INST., ADORATION OF THE QUESTION: REFLEC-

& ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
13-14 (Dec. 2008) (explaining that the 2002 amendment to the JJDPA "required that States 'address
juvenile delinquency prevention efforts and system improvement efforts designed to reduce, without
establishing or requiring numerical standards or quotas, the disproportionate number of juvenile
members of minority groups who come into contact with the juvenile justice system."').
59 FED. ADVISORY COMM. ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2008 xvi-xvii, 20-24 (2008).
Reasonable people can disagree about whether fund cut-offs would trigger the needed changes. The
Federal Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice has recommended expansion of the Justice Assistance Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program, promotion of community wide
collaboration, creation of funding incentives to pool funds from multiple federal programs, and interdisciplinary teams to develop cross-training models, legal models, technical assistance and emergency
services for children who are in both the juvenile justice and child welfare systems. Id.
TION ON THE FAILURE TO REDUCE RACIAL
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reinforced by JJDPA grantee assertions that a withholding of federal funding will
compromise the viability of both the law enforcement apparatus and the preservation of law and order. Thus, despite the grantee's failure to reduce DMC, the

grantor dares not risk withholding federal funds. Being tough on crime has political appeal for actors at both the state and federal level. Given the state of the
economy, those administering the JJDPA could become scapegoats blamed for

any juvenile crime if they cut back on resources as a penalty for failure to reduce
DMC in the juvenile justice system. We have not heard the last of "adult time for
adult crime" despite unequivocal evidence that waiver of juveniles into adult
court ultimately increases the likelihood of recidivism.6 °
Failure to address DMC sets the stage for an equal protection action under

§ 1983. Because of the nature of such a claim, liability will ensue if, and only if,
the parties injured by a state action that produces DMC can prove that the dis-

parity resulted from an intent to discriminate.
A.

Intentional Indifference Interferes with ConstitutionalRights: A Different
Approach for Remedy under § 1983

While numerous threshold requirements must be met to initiate a § 1983 action, there are two primary cases that have made it more difficult to prove intent
when bringing an action based on disparate impact. In Washington v. Davis, the
Supreme Court held that a mere showing of disparate racial impact of a facially

race neutral policy or practice is not sufficient to prove discriminatory intent.6 1
The Court later raised the hurdle for plaintiffs in McCleskey v. Kemp, where the
60 Diane H. Schetky, Juveniles Standing Trial: Waiver into Adult Court, J. OF PSYCHIATRIC
PRAC., Nov. 2003, at 3. "Two studies suggest that no only do they [juveniles held in adult correctional
facilities] have a higher rate of recidivism, but that recidivism occurs more rapidly than in controls
who remain in the juvenile justice system." Id.

*

According to The Sentencing Project:

A Florida study comparing recidivism rates for matched groups of youthful offenders
(comparable on the basis of the number and seriousness of past and current offenses as
well as socio-demographic characteristics) found that juveniles coming out of the adult

system were more likely to reoffend, to reoffend earlier, to commit more subsequent
offenses, and to commit more serious offenses than juveniles retained in the juvenile
system.
* A study of over 500 youth charged in Pennsylvania found that youths transferred to adult
court are more likely to be convicted and incarcerated but their recidivism rates are
higher than the rates for those who remain in juvenile court.
" A study comparing 15-16-year olds charged with robbery in New York and New Jersey
found that New York juveniles whose cases originated in criminal court were more likely
to reoffend and to reoffend sooner than the New Jersey juveniles whose cases were heard
in juvenile court.
MALCOLM C. YOUNG & JENNI GAINSBOROUGH, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, PROSECUTING
JUVENILES IN ADULT COURT: AN ASSESSMENT OF TRENDS AND CONSEQUENCES 9 (2000) (citations

omitted).
61 Washington, 426 U.S. at 245 (holding that the plaintiff must prove that the discriminatory
impact was the result of a specific racially discriminatory intent).
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petitioner presented what still stands as one of the most comprehensive multiregression studies ever conducted on the impact of race in sentencing. 62 However, even such a well-documented, statistically significant discriminatory pattern
was insufficient to support an inference that any of the decision-makers in McCleskey acted with discriminatory purpose. 63 McCleskey hoped to prove that administration of the death penalty was racially discriminatory and, accordingly,
that his death sentence violated the Constitution. 64 The Court reasoned that what
other juries had done in sentencing defendants to death did not prove that the
jury in McCleskey's case had discriminated against him on the basis of race.65
According to the Court, the probability of a discriminatory motive was insufficient to prove actual discrimination by one particular jury. 66 The Court further
observed that any number of other factors might have accounted for the McCleskey verdict and that the uniqueness of every jury forestalled
inferring motive in a
67
particular instance from a statistical pattern of disparity.
The McCleskey defense can be anticipated in response to a cause of action
brought by any particular juvenile in detention who alleges racial discrimination
in the decision to confine him or her in a secure facility. The circumstances of the
juvenile delinquency process, however, can be distinguished from McCleskey due
to the repetitive experience, professional expertise, and policy influence of the
juvenile justice decision-makers as compared to the McCleskey jury of lay community members.68
B.

Addressing the Requirement of Intent

Washington and McCleskey stand for the governing precedent that a showing
of disparate impact alone will not suffice. When it comes to a municipality or an
agency, actual intent to discriminate is necessary but virtually impossible to prove
- even where DMC exists, since some non-discriminatory public purpose justification for the policy or action can usually be found in each individual case. The
Supreme Court has, however, provided one explicit test which, if met, results in

liability: when "deliberate indifference" has been shown to rights protected by
the Constitution and federal laws. Under such circumstances, "execution of the
government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286-91.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 286-91.
Id. at 295-96.
Id.
Id. at 293-300.
See generally Morietary, supra note 2.
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Constitutional injury, that the government, as an entity, is responsible under
§ 1983.69
In City of Canton v. Harris,70 the Supreme Court determined that a local government could be held liable for the inadequate training of its police officers.
Justice White wrote:
We hold today that the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis
for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. This rule is most consistent with our admonition ...that a municipality
can be liable under §1983 only where its policies are the "moving force [behind] the constitutional violation." Only where a municipality's failure to
train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a "deliberate indifference" to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly
thought of as a city "policy or custom" that is actionable under §1983. As
Justice Brennan's opinion in Pembaur v. Cincinnati,put it: "[Miunicipal liability under §1983 attaches where - and only where - a deliberate choice to
follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives" by city
policymakers. Only where a failure to train reflects a "deliberate" or "conscious" choice by a municipality-a "policy" as defined by our prior cases-can
a city be liable for such a failure under §1983.71
This holding's essence is that liability can be based on constructive intent as inferred when officials have actual knowledge of predictable injury and yet they
reject or disregard known alternatives that would avert that injury. 72 Intent can
be inferred when a constitutional injury is substantially certain to result and the
decision-maker chooses to continue a course of action that perpetuates a pattern
tainted by racial bias rejecting known and available alternatives that would have
averted the injury.7 3 Moreover, an "objective obviousness" standard is employed
to identify the threshold for holding a government entity responsible for deliber69
70

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388.

71

Id. (citations omitted).

72 See, e.g., Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1992). In Walker, the
Second Circuit articulated three criteria for constructive intent: (1) the policymaker must know "to a
moral certainty" that his other employees will confront a particular situation; (2) "the situation either
presents the employee with a difficult choice of the sort that training or supervision will make less
difficult or... there is a history of employees mishandling the situation"; and (3) the wrong choice by
the employee frequently causes constitutional deprivation. Id. See also SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL
RIirrs AND CIVIL LIaERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SEcTION 1983 6-190 (4th ed. 1997, 2007).

73 A similar standard of "deliberate indifference" has been invoked in an Eighth Amendment
case involving cruel and unusual punishment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). In Farmer,
Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous court, defined the term deliberate indifference in the context
of criminal confinement as "the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 980.
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ate indifference to the constitutional rights for acts committed by its inadequately
trained agents. 74 The City of Canton Court's deliberate indifference inquiry into
liability focused on obviousness, or constructive notice, an objective standard for
inferring intent.
In the juvenile justice context, we propose to use this same deliberate indifference standard to redress violations of the Equal Protection Clause. Our theory is
that government policies and practices consistently subject a juvenile of color to
the infliction of sanctions that are predictably far greater and more punitive than
if the same offense had been committed by a white youth. Injuries stemming from
disproportionate minority contact include: deprivation of liberty; developmental
injury; blocked access to special education guaranteed by federal law and other
wrap-around services that are available to non-detained youth; an increased likelihood of personal injury; intensification of established risk factors; restricted
ability to find witnesses to contribute to defense preparation, and to secure probation; and, a predictably higher probability of recidivism.7 5 To prove "deliberate
indifference" for purposes of a §1983 claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1)
injury to a right protected by the Constitution or federal law; (2) that the injury
was relatively certain to occur; and (3) that the government's course of action was
one selected from among various alternatives. 76 Use of an alternative to detention will eliminate the injury that comes from current patterns of racially disproportionate detention decisions.
C. "DeliberateIndifference" Stems from a Duty to Use Knowledge

The origin of the juvenile justice system fundamentally relies on the intent to
provide for the welfare of the youth in its ambit, with rehabilitation being the
primary goal. The JJDPA promotes seeking the least restrictive alternative and
specifically anticipates detention only for those youth who pose either significant
risk of flight and failure to return to court, or risk of endangerment to themselves
or to public safety. 77 Estimates of the number of youth for whom detention is
74 Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 124 (1992).
75 Nancy Rodriguez, A Multilevel Analysis of Juvenile Court Processes: The Importance of
Community Characteristics 25 (Jun. 30, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with National Institute
for Justice), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdfftlesl/njj/grants/223465.pdf.
[J]uveniles who were informally processed were less likely to reoffend post age 17 in urban
jurisdictions. Models with the detention outcome as a predictor of recidivism reveal that
juveniles who were detained were more likely to recidivate post age 17 in both urban and
rural counties. [Jluveniles who were removed from the home at disposition were more likely
to reoffend post age 17. This effect was significant in both the urban and rural jurisdictions.
Id.
76 SWORD AND SHIELD: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 209-247 (Mary
Massoron Ross et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007) (1971).
77 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5603(19)(A) (2002); Austin,
supra note 44, at 1.
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warranted range from five to twenty-one percent of those routinely detained. 7 8 A
combination of procedures has been proven to dramatically reduce the average

daily population in secure detention without increased risk to public safety. These
include the use of objective risk screening instruments, 79 diversion from the sys-

tem altogether, expedited case processing, and rigorously designed alternatives to
detention. In fact, several states committed to reducing DMC were able to also

reduce juvenile crime and recidivism. 80 Every state receives funding expressly
dedicated to providing access to the knowledge and technical assistance needed

to reduce DMC; the strategy outlined in this article provides a way to ensure that
states actually do reduce DMC.
Every youth, irrespective of race, is entitled to a level of care that honors the

purpose of the JJDPA by limiting juvenile confinement to only the situations in
which it is truly required. Guaranteeing equal protection of the law requires government officials to be on notice that current practices result in a continuing injury that disproportionately impacts youth of color. Therefore, the injured
parties must serve formal notice on the relevant government officials that the

current practices result in a continuing injury. This notice should be coupled with
a presentation of effective and cost efficient alternatives to confinement. Refusal
to utilize these alternatives would constitute an intentional disregard of a foresee-

able injury and an infringement of constitutionally protected rights.
78 Two DECADES OF JDAI, supra note 2, at 7. "Few kids in detention (21 percent) are charged
with serious violent crimes, less than the number of detained youth for status offenses (i.e., noncriminal behaviors like being "unruly" or running away) or rule violations (e.g., missing curfew). As one
chief probation officer recently said about his detention population, 'These are kids we are angry at,
not kids we are scared of."' Id.
79 Austin, supra note 44, at 6, 8.
The key attributes of objective classification and risk assessment instruments are: [1] They
employ an objective scoring process; [2] They use items that can be easily and reliably measured meaning the results are consistent both across staff and over time as they relate to
individual staff members; and [3] They are statistically associated with future criminal behavior, so that the system can accurately identify offenders with different risk levels.
The factors to be considered in objective detention risk assessments can be separated into
four categories: [1] Number and severity of the current charges; [2] Earlier arrest and juvenile court records; [3] History of success or failure while under community supervision; and
[4] Other 'stability' factors associated with court appearances and reoffending (e.g. age,
school attendance, education level, drug/alcohol use, family structure).
Id.
80 The Annie E. Casey Foundation's Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, "is one of the
most effective, influential, and widespread juvenile justice reform initiatives" "after more than a decade of innovation and replication." Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, Annie E. Casey Foundation, http://www.aecf.Lorg/Majorlnitiatives/JuvenileDetentionA]ternativeslnitiative.aspx (last visited
Mar. 16, 2009) [hereinafter AECF Detention Alternatives Website]; ELIZABETH DRAKE, WASH.
STATE
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The OJJDP, through its partnership with Development Services Group, Inc.,
has gone to extraordinary lengths to make available knowledge about model programs and DMC reduction. 8 1 For the past twenty years, the Annie E. Casey
Foundation has implemented its Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative
("JDAI") in nearly one hundred locations throughout twenty-two states and the
District of Columbia.82 During the same period, the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation has invested in parallel efforts through its Model for
Change Initiative.83 We submit that the requisite proof of available alternatives is
provided by the extensive documentation of model programs by the OJJDP coupled with the extensive research on effective alternatives conducted by the Colorado Blueprints Project, the Washington State Institute for Public Policy, and the
nationally respected Annie E. Casey Foundation's JDAI. 84 These resources, developed over the past two decades, demonstrate efforts to create alternatives to
confinement that are effective and less costly than the prevailing practice.
The "deliberate indifference" strategy puts officials on formal notice of the
impact of current policies and practices and documents effective alternative remedies. After receiving formal notice, the continuance of a current practice represents an informed and deliberate choice to continue inflicting injury in lieu of
available alternatives that are authoritatively regarded as more effective and less
costly. If the responsible officials conduct business as usual, there is ample basis
for alleging and proving "deliberate indifference" or "intentional disregard." Litigation could commence, only after juvenile justice officials in the jurisdiction
have been put on notice of the injury flowing from their present juvenile incarceration practices given the availability of validated and affordable alternatives that
would not have caused a disparate impact.
In the private sector, continuing to employ a prevailing practice while disregarding knowledge of more efficacious and cost effective alternative interven85
tions would give rise to a claim of professional malpractice or gross negligence.
Admittedly, addressing DMC involves attacking a problem that stems from mul81 DSG Website, supra note 5. Both OJJDP's Model Programs Guide and DMC Reduction
Database are easily accessible from the home page.
82 AECF Detention Alternative Website, supra note 80. See also Two DECADES OF JDAI,
supra note 2.
83 Models for Change, Background and Principles, http://www.modelsforchange.net/about/
Background-and-principles.html.
84 AECF Detention Alternative Website, supra note 80; Center for the Study and Prevention of
Violence at the University of Colorado, Blueprints for the Prevention of Violence, http://www.
colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/index.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2009); Washington State Institute for
Public Policy, http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2009).
85 An obligation to keep abreast and make use of knowledge is commonplace in medical malpractice claims, product safety claims (most notably those involving asbestos), and where a fiduciary
obligation is involved. See, e.g., Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prod. Co., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973);
Feldman v. Lederle Labs, 470 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984).
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tiple factors embedded and entrenched in every aspect of life - e.g., economic,
social, educational, cultural, and geographic. 86 This is precisely why courts were
once likely to shy away from the issue of DMC altogether. But after more than
twenty years of skirting the issue because of its perceived complexity, there is a
growing body of knowledge regarding available, effective, and affordable remedies that can no longer be dismissed or ignored. In the context of long-standing
injurious disparity, the constitutional right to equal protection gives rise to an
obligation to use knowledge of what works.
A showing of actual knowledge of injury coupled with the rejection of proposed cost-effective, efficient alternatives meets or satisfies the intent requirement sufficiently to defeat a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. ''8 7 Doubtless, defendants would reply with a description of the efforts they have been making, the complexity of the problem, and the
need to come up with a comprehensive solution. Our focus on confinement is
something that can be implemented right away - and every youth of color kept
out of detention represents a reduction in disproportionate minority contact.
In regard to detention, the DMC situation parallels the disparity addressed by
the Supreme Court in Castenada v. Partida.88 Castenada involved a claim of discrimination based on a grand jury selection process where Spanish surnames
comprised 50% of the list from which the grand jurors were selected. "Three of
the five jury commissioners, five of the grand jurors who returned the indictment,
seven of the petit jurors, the judge presiding at the trial, and the Sheriff who
served notice on the grand jurors to appear had Spanish surnames. ' '8 9 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had established a discrimination
claim by presenting evidence that over an eleven-year period, only 39% of persons summoned for grand jury service were Mexican American when the
county's population was 79.1% Mexican American. 90 In short, the Court found
that this disproportionality coupled with a selection procedure susceptible to
9
abuse was sufficient to make a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. '
86
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DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DISPROPORTIONATE MINOR-

ITY CONTACT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL (2006). Specific reference is made to this difficulty in

the Introduction. Lesson 2 states, "Many factors contribute to DMC at different juvenile justice system contact points, and a multipronged intervention is necessary to reduce DMC." Id.
87

FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).

88 Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). The issue then becomes: what acts constitute a
rejection of these alternatives, what constitutes a good faith effort to make use of available knowledge, and what action over what period of time constitutes merely dilatory tactics? Getting beyond
the "intent" barrier to those questions would lay the foundation for defining meaningful indicators of
progress in reducing DMC. A significant reduction in the number of youth of color detained would be
a primary measure.
89 Id. at 484.
90 Id. at 496.
91 Id. at 497-98.
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When the burden of proof shifted, the State failed to rebut this prima facie presumption, despite the racially neutral qualifications for grand jurors and despite
the fact that Mexican Americans held a "governing majority" in the county's
elected offices.9 2

Similar to Castenada, the criteria for reaching a determination of whether to
detain a juvenile offender are purportedly neutral on their face while the ultimate
decision-making process is discretionary and susceptible to abuse. And, there is
also a multi-year disproportionality in the detention of juveniles of color. The
availability of alternatives proven to radically reduce the use of detention at each
stage in the process from arrest to post-adjudication through diversion, risk assessment instruments, and community-based wrap-around services supports the
assertion that youth of color have been denied Equal Protection if the system
refuses to change.
Abusive use of detention by juvenile justice systems is peculiarly ironic. On
one hand, the system was established to safeguard the best interests of the juvenile by imposing a duty on officials to care for the juveniles over whom the system has jurisdiction. On the other hand, these officials default on their duty when
they know of efficacious, less costly alternatives and allow infliction of injury by
racially biased confinement decisions to persist.
D. Addressing the Requirement of Causation

Commentators have noted that without causation, "negligent or even grossly
negligent training would not give rise to a §1983 municipal liability claim." 93 A
successful plaintiff must, therefore be able to demonstrate a sufficiently close
causal connection between the deliberately indifferent training and the deprivation of the plaintiff's federally protected right.
Even upon finding "intentional disregard" or interference with fundamental
rights, the reasoning of the Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp would appear
to impose a further requirement for Equal Protection claims: not only must race
be a factor in the disparities generated by the system, but race must be shown to
have been a causal factor present in each particular case. 94 Admittedly, some
youth ought to be confined securely. However, experts observe that far more
young people than can be justified by safety concerns are in secure confinement
all across the country. Furthermore, each youth has a right to counsel and the
opportunity to demonstrate that detention is not appropriate or necessary in his
or her individual case. Therefore, a respondent could contend that there is no
causal relationship in any individual case between the injury caused by racially
92 Id.
93 SWORD AND SHIELD, supra note 71, at 33-34.
94 See Moriearty, supra note 2, at 323 (discussing how race falls outside the rationale in McCleskey v. Kemp).
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biased decisions to incarcerate and the failure to use knowledge about
alternatives.
Professor Perry Moriearty, in a recent law review article, argued that the refusal of the Court in McCleskey to infer the operation of a racial motive in a
specific capital case should not apply to the detention of juveniles:
In every critical respect Juvenile Court pretrial detention decisions in many
jurisdictions are analogous to the jury venire decision at issue in Castaneda
...and are distinguishable from the capital sentencing decision at issue in
McCleskey ...By the McCleskey Court's own reasoning, then, an equal
protection challenge to the discriminatory pretrial detention of youth of
color in the juvenile justice system should be analyzed under the Castenada
three-pronged inquiry: a claimant would create an inference of discriminatory intent if she could demonstrate that she was a member of a historically
disadvantaged class that has been overrepresented in the population of
juveniles detained by the judge or probation officer in question over a significant amount of time.9 5
Unlike a jury verdict, a decision to detain a juvenile is made by professionals who
can be required to explain the rational basis underlying their decision. As Professor Moriearty points out, "the nature of juvenile detention decisions, in many
jurisdictions, places them squarely within the contours of the type of administrative decisions for which, according to Justice Powell, evidence of disparate impact
96
alone may be sufficient to create an inference of discriminatory intent.",
In juvenile cases, as distinguished from jury verdicts, the decision-makers are
professionally trained, the criteria are ostensibly prescribed by statute, and actors
can be called upon to explain the racial disparities produced by their confinement
decisions. 97 A sufficient causal relationship between intentional disregard and the
injury flowing from detention can be proven where the disparities are known,
where a "race effect" is present, and where a choice has been made to maintain
the existing system even after alternatives that would reduce that disparity have
been formally presented to and rejected by the relevant juvenile justice
administrators.
We suggest, as a tactical matter, that the issue of whether race was a factor in
any specific confinement decision would be best eliminated by a class action lawsuit. Plaintiffs would seek prospective relief from a continuing practice that fails
to make secure confinement the choice of last resort - i.e., a choice made only

95
96
97

Id. at 331-32.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 291.
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after all other alternatives have been exhausted.

These claims would best be

raised in a class action context. Such a tactic is imperative given the well-documented absence of effective counsel in a vast number of juvenile cases99 and the
inability of a juvenile respondent to effectively challenge a widespread practice of
unnecessary detention.too
III.

WE KNOW A GREAT DEAL ABOUT ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION

First, it should be acknowledged that no alternative to detention can totally
eliminate recidivism. 10 1 This makes secure confinement appealing to decisionmakers. On its face, incarceration gives the appearance of protection for the public and in theory, presents an opportunity to provide rehabilitative treatment for
the youth. However, this overall sense of public safety belies the evidence now
available: unnecessarily excessive juvenile detention begets crime. Crowded facilities result in increased institutional violence. 10 2 Youth detained for long periods
of time usually do not have the opportunity to further their education, nor are
treatment programs in detention facilities designed to address substance abuse or
a history of physical or sexual abuse. 10 3 Even more disturbingly, consistent research findings indicate that detention actually increases recidivism. These find98 Carter v. Doyle, 95 F. Supp. 2d 851 (N.D Ill. 2000) (finding that the class action did not
become moot even after final judgment was entered against the juvenile finding him to be
delinquent).
99 In 1995, the American Bar Association's Juvenile Justice Center published A Call for Justice:
An Assessment of Access to Counsel and Quality of Representation in Delinquency Proceedings, a
national study that revealed major failings in juvenile defense across the nation. Since that time,
numerous state-based assessments have documented, in detail, the manner in which these failings
result in lifelong, harmful consequences for our nation's children. Common findings among these
assessments include a lack of access to competent counsel, inadequate time and resources for defenders to prepare for hearings or trials, a juvenile court culture that encourages respondents to plead
guilty, to move cases quickly, a lack of pretrial and dispositional advocacy and an over-reliance on
probation. All National Juvenile Defender Center Assessments are available at http://www.njdc.info/
assessments.php. See NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR, & NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Assoc.,
TEN CORE PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING QUALITY REPRESENTATION THROUGH PUBLIC DEFENSE DE-

(Jul. 2008), http://www.njdc.info/pdf/10 Core-Principles_- 2008.pdf.
100 ROAD MAP FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 8-9. "Just 24 percent of youth confined
in 2003 were adjudicated for violent felonies, whereas more than 45 percent were guilty only of status
offenses; probation violations; misdemeanors; or low-level felonies unrelated to violence, weapons or
drug trafficking." Id. In 2006, only 21% of detained youth were held for violent crimes and 10% for
simple assaults and other person offenses whereas the majority of youths were held for property,
drugs, "public order and other crimes, 41%; and status offenses, 28%. Two DECADES OF JDAI, supra
note 2,at 7.
101 Austin, supra note 44, at 1.
102 MELISSA SICKMUND, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION. JUVENILE RESIDENTIAL FACILITY CENSUS, 2000: SELECTED FINDINGS 1 (2002); Paul Florsheim & Tim
Fowles, An Interpersonal-DevelopmentalPerspective on Juvenile Justice Systems, 10 J. L. & FAM.
STUD. 147 (2007).
LIVERY SYSTEMS
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Austin, supra note 44, at 2.
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ings show that secure detention makes it more, not less, likely that a youth will
commit additional crime - though there may be a delay factor built in. 10 4 In other
words, confinement exacts more than a temporary deprivation of liberty. It imposes the heightened prospect that a youth will commit future crime against society once the youth is ultimately released. Moreover, by halting the youth's
development, confinement increases the likelihood that the youth will become a
drain on society instead of a producer of wealth and wellbeing.
There is a growing national consensus, expressly reflected in the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act ("JJDPA"), that secure detention should be
used as "an option of last resort only for serious, violent and chronic offenders
and for those who repeatedly fail to appear for scheduled court dates.' 10 5 "Just
14% of more than 50,000 youth in 28 states detained in the 1990s had committed
a serious violent offense. Prior to 2005 in the District of Columbia, only 17% of
confined youth were serious violent offenders."' 0 6
Only a small fraction of youth confined in juvenile facilities have histories that
warrant confinement. 10 7 Extensive research coupled with cost-benefit analyses
support the need for a policy shift for all youth - regardless of race. This research
should be accorded even greater weight in the context of disproportionate minority contact and supports but one conclusion: except in those truly exceptional
circumstances where confinement is clearly warranted, divert the youth before he
or she enters the system by providing alternatives to detention that place the
youth in the community with access to services - preferably in his or her own
household with access to family.10 8
A.

Alternatives to Secure Detention and Confinement Cost Less and
Work Better

This Article does not purport to provide an exhaustive review of the full range
of alternatives to detention that have been tested, replicated, and evaluated. It
104 Id. at 2-3. Research on traditional confinement in large training schools found recidivism
rates ranging from 50-70% of previously confined youth were rearrested within 1 or 2 years after

release. See also ROAD

MAP FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE,

supra note 31, at 9.

105 Austin, supra note 44, at 1; Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 5633(a)(9)(L)(i) (2002).
106 ROAD MAP FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 19.
107 Id.
108 DANGERS OF DETENTION, supra note 2, at 8. Diversion programs - often restricted to the
first-time offenders facing charges on a non-violent offense - are designed to divert the youngster
from the bowels of the juvenile delinquency system and its attendant path to facilities for incarceration. For example, young people in San Francisco's Detention Diversion Advocacy Program have
approximately half the recidivism rate of juveniles ordered to detention or funneled elsewhere
through the juvenile justice system. Continued confinement of non-violent offenders in the face of
substantial success at rehabilitation or preventing recidivism is indicative of a governmental apparatus
intent on meting out punishment rather than pursuing the rehabilitative solutions for which juvenile
courts were established.
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will suffice to provide a brief overview of the extensive work and research undertaken in this field over at least two decades, along with some of the findings that
have emerged and the materials that have been produced.
The short survey begins with the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention ("OJJDP"), which issued a Juvenile Justice Bulletin ("the Bulletin")
in 2002 that "promotes reducing the court's reliance on detention and confinement through administrative reforms and special program initiatives informed by
an objective assessment of a youth's risk level." 10 9 OJJDP has identified model
programmatic responses available for every element and at every stage of the
process that contributes to DMC and offers a web-based directory to assist states
in developing initiatives to reduce DMC. 110 The Bulletin extensively describes
several alternatives to detention with an extensive bibliography,1 11 and includes
sample "Risk Assessment Instruments" used by several jurisdictions to provide
an objective basis for determining whether or not detention is warranted.1 1 2 It
also provides a concise description (with contact information) of a continuum of
alternatives coupled with evaluation data for each approach, including: diversion,
supervised release, home detention, electronic monitoring, intensive supervision,
day and evening reporting centers, skills training programs, residential programs
such as foster homes, and programs for runaway youth. 11 3 The Bulletin, along
with extensive materials provided by the Annie E. Casey Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative project, attest to the mushrooming body of knowledge about
promising strategies to reduce detention and confinement of youth." 4
The development of objective screening criteria and risk assessment instruments first made it possible to limit the use of detention to high risk cases. Several case processing reforms have expedited case flow so that youth are not
unnecessarily held in detention pending initial hearing or arraignment - e.g., new
police referral procedures, 24-hour intake, fast track hearings, case expediters,
and increased automation. During the past few decades there has also been extensive development, experimentation, refinement, and utilization of alternatives
to detention pending an adjudicatory hearing. Finally, due to a major investment
in cost-benefit analysis and evaluation, the body of knowledge regarding the costeffectiveness of various juvenile rehabilitation strategies continues to expand.
109 Austin, supra note 44, at 1. Detention is confinement or incarceration of a juvenile in a
secure facility before an adjudicatory finding of involvement. Id. There is also evidence of DMC in the
rate of confinement of juveniles of color in secure facilities after they have been found involved in a
juvenile delinquent act, akin to the court finding an adult defendant guilty of a crime. DANGERS OF
DETENTION, supra note 2, at 8.
110 DSG Website, supra note 5.
111 Austin, supra note 44, at 24-29.
112 Id. at 29.
113 Id. at 13-20.
114 See, e.g., AECF Detention Alternatives Website, supra note 80; Two DECADES OF JDAI,
supra note 2.
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B.

Private PhilanthropyFunded Expansion of Alternatives to
Juvenile Incarceration

Much of the knowledge about alternatives to incarceration stems from foundation-funded initiatives that have significantly reduced the use of detention while
also generating a derivative reduction in DMC. Two foundation initiatives have
been at the forefront of developing alternatives to detention and reducing DMC:
the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative of the Anne E. Casey Foundation
("JDAI") and the Models for Change Initiative of the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation. These two philanthropic initiatives have enabled states
and counties to develop, utilize, and validate effective and less expensive alternatives to detention.
1. Success of the Casey Foundation's Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiative
- Local

Through participation in the Casey Foundation-funded JDAI, Multnomah
County, Oregon became "the first jurisdiction to produce substantial reduction in
racial disparity within its juvenile justice system."' 115 The Casey Foundation's
2008 Report notes that "[w]hen Multnomah began JDAI in the mid 1990s, youth
of color were 30% more likely than white youth to be detained following a delinquency arrest., 1 16 Because no other viable location existed, Multnomah County
law enforcement officials brought almost
1400 youth charged with non-detainable
17
offenses to the detention center.'
Reform of the system began when the County's Department of Community
Justice and Police, with assistance from a non-profit agency, established a Juvenile Reception Center where caseworkers, rather than the court or probation personnel, reunited the youth with their families and referred them to appropriate
services.11 8 About five years later, by 2000, detention reforms and persistent
leadership had reduced the odds of detention to 22% for all youth, regardless of
race. 119 The progress was no accident. By reviewing system data, local leaders
identified decision points where racial disparities were prominent. Where structural bias or exercise of discretion was found to have "placed youth of color at a
disadvantage, the leaders made [systemic] changes. '1 20 As a result, detention was
reduced for all youth and, even more relevant to this Article, disproportionate
minority contact had effectively been eliminated.
115
116
117
118
119
120

ROAD MAP FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE,

supra note 31, at 24.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ROAD MAP FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE,

supra note 31, at 24.
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From 1996 to 2006, using the JDAI model, Cook County (Chicago), Illinois
reduced the youth committed to confinement by 500 per year and to residential
treatment centers by more than 400. The greatest reductions were among the
number of African American youth. 121 A similar trend was documented in Santa
Cruz County, California, where reforms reduced the average number of Latino
youth in detention by more than 50% from 1996 to 2007.122

2.

Success of the MacArthur Foundation's Models for Change Initiative Local

The Model for Change Initiative "supports reform in 16 states and aims to
help accelerate a national juvenile justice reform movement to improve the lives
of young people in trouble with the law, while enhancing public safety and holding young offenders accountable for their actions." 1 23 Pennsylvania, a participant
in the Models for Change Initiative, has seen a reduction in detention rates in
Berks County. "Since 2007, Berks County has reduced its detention population
by 45% without compromising public safety.' 24 The county was able to reduce
its detention population because it used "data-driven analysis of key decision
points in Berks County" and then created a detention assessment instrument, an
1 25
evening reporting center, and used alternatives to out of home placements.
Because of the reduction in detention caused by the data-driven, purposeful decision-making, "the County has permanently removed 24 beds from its secure detention program, altering the space to create a shelter for youth who cannot
return home for safety reasons . ..."26

C. Assessing Effectiveness

During the past thirty years, a variety of community-based models have
emerged. Those designated as "evidence-based" include Multi-Systemic Therapy,
Functional Family Therapy and Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care. Although these models remain relatively small-scale pilot projects in otherwise unreformed systems, they nevertheless provide rock-solid evidence of more
effective, less expensive, consistently successful alternatives to incarceration. 127
121 Id. at 3.
122 Id. at 8.
123 The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Juvenile Justice, http://www.
macfound.org/site/c.IkLXJ8MQKrH/b.943477/k.9538[DomesticGrantmaking-JuvenileJustice.htm.
124 Models for Change, Reducing the Incarcerationof Youth of Color in Berks County (May 13,
2009), http://www.modelsforchange.net/reform-progress/14.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 DSG Website, supra note 5. OJJDP's Model Programs Guide rates the effectiveness of a
variety of programs using the following designations: "promising", "effective" and "exemplary." Id.
Programs are evaluated according to four factors: conceptual framework of the program; program
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On a larger scale, extensive reviews and evaluations of wrap-around services
and intensive case management initiatives have documented positive results in
many jurisdictions. 128 Because wrap-around programs are neighborhood-based,
customized to each community, make use of lay advocates, and are invariably
shaped by individual, family and local contexts, there have not been the controlled randomized trials (CRT) required for a strategy to gain the "evidence29
based" designation.'
While there is an increasing institutional, and even a policy, bias towards formal CRT, with control groups and random assignment, other evaluation method1 30
ologies proffer significant advances in reliable information and knowledge.
Over more than two decades these "non-evidence-based" programs have consistently shown major reductions in recidivism. For3 1 that reason, they have earned
designation as Model Programs by the OJJDP.1
We have personal experience with two effective alternatives to detention: The
Time Dollar Youth Court ("T-D Youth Court") diversion program, authorized by
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, and the Youth Advocate Programs, Inc. ("YAP"), a community-based program of wrap-around services. Both
fidelity; evaluation design; and, empirical evidence demonstrating the prevention or reduction of
problem behavior, the reduction of risk factors related to problem behavior, or the enhancement of
protective factors related to problem behavior. Id.
128 OJJDP's Model Program Guide, http://www.dsgonline.com/mpg2.5/wraparound-prevention.htm. The guide documents the successes of wraparound case management services and programs. Id.
129 We propose that juvenile justice administrators should not limit their options for demonstrably effective programs solely to those that bear the "evidenced-based" designation. Youth Courts
and other wraparound programs work and have been shown to have significant and sustained positive
outcomes in more than one site. The juvenile justice field needs to promote constant innovation and
should promote constant innovation. Community based learning and social entrepreneurship reflects
"common sense" responses to the needs of young people.
130

Michael Quinn Patton, 120 NEw DIREcTIONS FOR EVALUATION 101, 114 (2008). Michael

Patton, a former president of the American Evaluation Association, supports appropriateness - not
CRT - as "the gold standard" of evaluation. Id. He describes the need to counter "inflexible institutional biases toward specific methodologies such as experimental designs" and notes that this is the
standard affirmed by the American Evaluation Association, the European Evaluation Society, and
the Network of Networks on Impact Evaluation. Id.
131 See e.g. The Youth Prison Reduction through Opportunities, Mentoring, Intervention, Support, and Education Act of 2009, H.R. 1064 111th Cong. (2009) (introduced by Rep. Scott) [hereinafter Youth PROMISE Act]. The purpose of the Youth PROMISE Act is to use the "wide range of
evidence-based and promising programs, integrated into a youth-oriented community system of care
[because it] has been demonstrated to reduce youth violence, delinquency, and crime risks, as well as
criminal justice, public assistance, victim assistance, and other cost. H.R. 1064 § 4(2). Furthermore,
the specific findings of the Youth PROMISE Act includes the finding that, "many alternatives to
incarceration of youth have been proven to be more effective in reducing crime and violence at the
National, State, local, and tribal levels, and the failure to provide for such effective alternatives is a
pervasive problem that leads to increased youth, and later adult, crime and violence." H. R. 1064
§ 4(17).
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programs have proved highly successful in furthering youth development and reducing recidivism. One is particularly effective prior to adjudication; the other
has a proven track record as an alternative to institutional confinement following
adjudication. Both efforts incorporate a "co-production" framework,13 2 in which
the "consumers" of human service programs and interventions - the youth themselves - are enlisted as co-workers and "co-producers" of the transformation desired. 13 3 These two programs incorporate a set of core principles that we believe
offer an even more enduring and transformative approach to address delinquent
conduct than the "evidence-based" programs now enjoying authoritative
34
endorsement.1

1. Time Dollar Youth Court ("T-D Youth Court")
"The Time Dollar Youth Court was authorized in 1996 by the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia to work with the courts in a 'partnership for the purpose of jointly developing a diversion program that provides a meaningful alternative to the traditional adjudication format in juvenile cases."1 35 For twelve
years T-D Youth Court has successfully diverted juvenile, non-violent first time
offenders away from the juvenile delinquency system. In 2008, T-D Youth Court
jurors heard 912 cases for offenses such as simple assault, possession with intent
132 See EDGAR CAHN, No MORE THROW-AWAY PEOPLE: THE CO-PRODUCTION IMPERATIVE
(2d ed. 2004); EDGAR CAHN, PRICELESS MONEY: BANKING TIME FOR CHANGING TIMES (2007); NEW
ECONOMICS FOUND., THE NEW WEALTH OF TIME: HOW TIMEBANKING HELPS PEOPLE BUILD BETTER PUBLIC SERVICES (2007); PHELPS-STOKES FUND, COMING HOME: AN ASSET-BASED APPROACH
TO TRANSFORMING SELF & COMMUNITY - VOL. 1 CO-PRODUCTION AT WORK (2008).

133 Co-Production is premised on the conviction that efforts to address major social problems
prove most effective when they enlist and engage the target population as contributors and co-producers. It is an approach to system change and social welfare that focuses on the idea that the traditional beneficiaries of social programs: clients, recipients, consumers, and at-risk populations can "coproduce" outcomes that address issues as diverse as eldercare, childcare, juvenile justice, education,
community development, health, self-sufficiency, and opportunity.
134 Those core principles are:
(1) An Asset Perspective: We must build on strengths; one cannot build on weaknesses;
every human being has capacities of potential use and value to others;
(2) Valuing Real Work: We must honor real work: caring labor, civic labor, social justice
labor and lifelong learning. Rewards for contribution must enhance one's quality of life;
(3) Reciprocity - or Pay It Forward: Giving back empowers the recipient so that receiving
help is not regarded as charity and does not create dependency;
(4) Community: Building a social infrastructure of help, support, companionship and trust is
essential; and,
(5) Respect: The voices of those who are most disenfranchised need to be amplified and
respected.
See also Edgar S. Cahn, Co-ProducingJustice: The New Imperative, 5 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 105 (2000).
135 ime Dollar Youth Court Home Page, http://www.tdyc.org.
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to distribute marijuana, and disorderly conduct. 136 Typically, recidivism rates during the first six months after referral to T-D Youth Court were a mere 5% and
twelve months after referral recidivism has risen only to 9%.137 Both the sixmonth and one-year recidivism rates are far below the prevailing 33-35% recidivism rate for the comparison group. The estimated nationwide cost of Youth
Court programs is $458 per respondent compared to: (1) the costs of probation,
estimated cost of $1,635 per youth; and, (2) juvenile justice
processing, estimated
138
costs ranging between $21,000 and $84,000 per case.
2. Youth Advocate Programs, Inc. ("YAP")
For the past thirty years, the Youth Advocate Programs, Inc. ("YAP") has
operated a community-based wraparound program that now reaches sixteen
states and works annually with approximately 10,000 youth who would otherwise
have been in secure confinement at an average annualized cost of $88,000.139
YAP has been extraordinarily successful with some of the most entrenched and
chronic juvenile offenders by hiring and training community members to function
as advocates who work to strengthen the family and build an informal support
network for the young person. 140 One of YAP's sites, the Tarrant County Advocate Program-North ("TCAP") underwent extensive review and earned official
characterization as a "successful intensive probation program."' 141 TCAP uses
paid mentors and advocates who link the youth with community-based services.
Programs include "counseling, job training, subsidized youth employment, vocational training, anger management classes, tutoring, community service restitution projects, character development courses, and parent education classes." 142 In
136 CAROLYN D. DALLAS & RENE M. GORNALL, A FIVE YEAR LOOK AT PARTICIPATION IN
THE TIME DOLLAR YOUTH COURT, INC. DIVERSION PROGRAM: PROGRESS REPORT 2004 TO 2009 2

(2009).
137

Id.

138 SARAH S. PEARSON & SONIA JURICH, AM. YOUTH COURT: A COMMUNITY SOLUTION FOR
EMBRACING AT-RISK YOUTH 16 (2005).

139 Youth Advocate Programs, Inc., 10 Fast Facts about YAP, http://www.yapinc.org/index.
php?plD=57 (last visited Mar. 10, 2009); see Two DECADES OF JDAI supra note 2, at 7.
140 DSG Website, supra note 5. The Model Programs Guide contains many such indications of
improvements and accomplishments by programs in multiple jurisdictions.
141

Austin, supra note 44, at 19; RONALD B. REA ET AL., FINAL EVALUATION REPORT OF THE

HARRIS COUNTY YOUTH ADVOCATE PROGRAMS (YAP) (2003). Perhaps the most important finding
is that young offenders can be served in their home communities and neighborhoods by members of
their communities who are recruited, provided with a limited amount of pre-service training and supervised by professional staff in providing direct services to the youth and their families. The program
model can be operated at less than half of the cost of residential contract services and achieves a
success rate that compares favorably with the more expensive residential service. Based on an analysis
of the closed cases, the YAP is realizing successful outcomes for approximately 80% of the clients
enrolled in their program.
142 Id.
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2002, TCAP served over 500 youth and their families - nearly 400 families completed the entire program. 143 OJJDP reported that "[o]f these youth, 96 percent
were successfully maintained in the community or were diverted from
out-oft44
home placement or commitment to the Texas Youth Commission."'
We cite these programs because they exemplify the growth in knowledge that
has mushroomed over the past several decades. Indeed, they embody a new approach to juvenile justice which takes strength-based youth development quite
literally. These programs regard juvenile offenders as neighborhood assets who
can be enlisted to contribute to rebuilding the sense and quality of life in a community - all the while radically reducing disproportionate minority contact, recidivism, and crime - at a fraction of the cost of incarceration.
D. Alternatives Beat Incarcerationin the Cost-Benefit Analysis

Besides effectiveness, cost is the other major factor that public officials bear in
mind when choosing a course of action for youthful offenders. Ongoing studies of
the cost of secure detention versus the cost of alternatives to detention consistently show that alternatives to detention are far less expensive than keeping a
youth in secure detention. 145 As one commentator writes, "[wihile states spend
millions of dollars on detention centers, the community-based programs are held
together by a fair amount of gum, tape, and baling wire.' 14 6 For example, "Texas
spends $57,000 a year incarcerating each minor. ' 147 Other jurisdictions average
between $32,000 and $65,000 annually per minor, with far higher average costs
reflected in the highest cost-of-living regions. By comparison, most communitybased, wrap-around programs boast annual costs considerably less than $20,000
per youth, with many as low as $13,000. ,148 "States spent about $5.7 billion in
2007 to imprison 64,558 youth committed to residential facilities. '149 According
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2003: UNLOCKING THE FUTURE 23 (2003).
The Coalition provides the following comparative data: New York City, secure confinement at $358
per day and alternative to detention at $16-24 per day; Cook County (Chicago, IL), secure detention
at $115 per day and alternative at $33 per day; Multnomah County (Portland, OR), secure detention
at $180-200 per day and alternative to detention at $30-50 per day; Tarrant County (Dallas/Ft. Worth,
TX) at secure detention $121 per day, an intensive advocacy program at $30-35 per day, and electronic monitoring at $3.50-3.75 per day. Id.
146 David L. Marcus, Communities Helping Kids, THE AM.PROSPECT, Aug.14, 2005, http://
www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=commmunities-helping-kids.
147 Id.
148 DANGERS OF DETENTION, supra note 2, at 10-11.
149 JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE COSTS OF CONFINEMENT: WHY GOOD JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICIES MAKE GOOD FISCAL SENSE 4 (May 2009), http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/0905

REP_CostsOfConfinementJJPS.pdf.
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per
to the American Correctional Association, "on average, it costs states $240.99
150
day - around $88,000 a year - for every youth in a juvenile facility."'
The benefit of an investment in community-based alternatives escalates upon
consideration of the 50% recidivism rate for young people within two years of
release from secure confinement. The Washington State Institute for Public Policy ("WSIPP"), at the direction of its state legislature, conducted extensive research assessing the effectiveness of prevention and early intervention programs
to reduce at-risk behaviors for children and youth and identified specific research-proven programs that result in a positive cost-benefit analysis. 15 1 WSIPP
developed criteria designed to ensure quality implementation and program fidelity of research-proven programs in the state. 152 Cost-benefit studies of those programs have produced some startling figures ranging from a benefit of $31,243 for
each dollar spent to negative value of $12,478 of the Scared Straight program,
after subtracting costs. 153 The legislature also directed WSIPP to develop recommendations for potential state legislation that would encourage local governments to invest in research-proven prevention and early intervention programs
by reimbursing a portion of the savings accruing to the state as a result of the
5
local programs. 1
IV.

CAN COURTS EFFECT SYSTEM CHANGE?

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY:

COURTS AND SYSTEM REFORM

Our hope is that, prior to litigation, concerned juvenile justice advocates will
employ a "public notice forum" to put officials on formal notice of the extent to
which youth of color have disproportionate contact within their respective juvenile justice systems. By design, a notice forum will demonstrate the injury that
flows from both the "race effect" in the juvenile justice process and the resulting
unnecessary detention and confinement of youth of color. A notice forum will
also provide evidence of the availability of cost-efficient, officially-recommended,
and demonstrably-effective alternatives to confinement. Successful notice forums
will either obviate the need for litigation or provide the record necessary to prove
intentional disregard.
150
151

Id.

152

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.530 (LexisNexis 2009).

153
154

DRAKE, supra note 75.

ROBERT BARNOSKY, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, EVALUATION OF WASHINGTON'S 1996 JUVENILE COURT PROGRAM (EARLY INTERVENTION PROGRAM) FOR HIGH-RISK, FIRSTTIME OFFENDERS: FINAL REPORT (Apr. 2003), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/EIPfmal.pdf.

ROBERT BARNOSKY, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, THE COMMUNITY JUVENILE
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT: RESEARCH-PROVEN INTERVENTIONS FOR THE JUVENILE COURTS (Jan. 1999),
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/CJAAResearch.pdf. The result of this mandate was the Community
Juvenile Accountability Act, since codified in WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 13.40.510 (LexisNexis 2009).
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A notice forum can take many forms: a blue ribbon commission, a caucus of
state legislators, a select committee, a judicial convening or more. The first such
forum will likely be convened by a group of concerned inner-city legislators
whose constituencies are most directly affected by the high concentrations of
youth of color historically drawn into the "cradle to prison pipeline." Such a forum would do more than put officials on notice of effective, less expensive alternatives. It would enfranchise families and neighborhoods, by providing them with
a platform to voice injury and to advocate change, information about alternatives, and an opportunity to begin holding the system accountable to produce
better outcomes and lower recidivism rates. It would provide legislators with the
opportunity to exercise oversight of the federally mandated State Advisory
Group charged with making plans and recommending grants to implement the
core requirement of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. Ideally
such forums could provide an opportunity for those youth who have been in detention and others who have benefited from alternatives to detention to inform
community leaders about the world that only they know. Finally, the voices of
those who have benefitted from system change need to be heard because advocates for reform need youth allies who can share their personal stories and attest
to the benefits they have derived from innovative community-based practices.
Without such a constituency, progress in breaking the current addiction to detention is all too vulnerable to a fatal setback if even one juvenile who might have
been detained does something bad. Those cases are as predictable as they are
rare; they will generate exponential backlash if they are not countered by youth
who can say: "You get twenty or fifty of us for every one who slips through the
cracks. And we are your future family heads, taxpayers, and leaders."
Emerging research demonstrates the savings derived from use of diversion and
alternatives to detention. Such a cost-benefit analysis is important because the
officials who administer the juvenile justice system are likely to plead "system
poverty," particularly in the current economic environment.1 55 Government officials are obligated to seek the most cost-effective strategies to meet their policy
objectives, especially when less costly strategies produce a much higher rate of
long and short-term success while preventing a constitutionally prohibited injury.
Following a formal hearing where notice of effective alternatives has been provided, officials may choose to resist system change by maintaining business as
usual, or to go through the motions of a response by announcing a plan that is
clearly inadequate to end racial bias.' 56 There clearly needs to be pressure to
155 AECF Detention Alternatives Website, supra note 80; DRAKE, supra note 75.
156 Interview with Bart Lubow, Dir. of Programs for High Risk Youth & Their Families, Annie
E. Casey Found., in Baltimore, MD (Jan. 22, 2009). Mr. Lubow reported that the Georgia legislature
undertook a response by appropriating millions of dollars for programs that would provide 500 slots
as alternatives to detention. Id. The programs were launched and all slots were filled; however, the
numbers of juveniles placed in criminal institutions was not reduced. Id.
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reduce the use of detention, not only by offering alternatives to juvenile deten-

tion, but also by limiting the number of available secure confinement slots.
It will take strategic litigation planning, akin to Charles Houston's work in
plotting the road to Brown v. Board of Education,' 57 to identify the best litigants
within a jurisdiction where there is a clear violation. The OJJDP monitors violations of the JJDPA, and there is no shortage of cases. 158 Given the plethora of
research and data filed with the federal government, county-level analyses should

surface examples where two juveniles of the same socio-economic class and system involvement committed the same offense, where (as in our hypothetical comparison in Appendix) the youth of color was not diverted but was instead charged
and detained, while the white youth was sent home. Once such evidence is obtained, the issue becomes securing a remedy that compels officials to use knowl-

edge of what works. Assuming that intent is established under the theory of
deliberate indifference, the next hurdle will be getting judges to oversee system

change when it comes to prisons and secure confinement facilities - a problem of
ancient vintage. 159 This obstacle is not insurmountable; there is now a substantial
body of case law dealing with "public law litigation" and ongoing judicial supervi-

sion of systemic reform. These cases involve public services provided by schools,
1 60
hospitals, mental health systems, prisons, police, and housing authorities.

Initially, judicial intervention was characterized by what has been called a
"command-and-control" orientation. Court orders took the form of comprehensive regimes of "fixed and specific rules that prescribed the inputs and operating
procedures of the institutions they regulated. ' 161 Commentators have identified

three characteristics that typify this "command and control" approach: (1) "an
effort to anticipate and express all the key directives needed to induce compli-

ance in a single, comprehensive, and hard-to-change decree"; 162 (2) "assessment
of compliance in terms of the defendant's conformity to detailed prescriptions of
157 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For an in-depth discussion of Houston's legal
strategy, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 508-40 (1977).
158 Mead Gruver, Some States Disregard Juvenile Justice Law, ABC NEWS, Feb. 8,2009, http://
abcnews.go.comfUS/wireStory?id=6831314.
159

Bernard Shaw, Preface to

SYDNEY WEBB ET AL., ENGLISH PRISONS UNDER LOCAL

Gov.

at viii (Cass 1963) (1922) ("Judges spend their lives in consigning their fellow creatures to
prison; and when some whisper reaches them that prisons are horribly cruel and destructive places,
and that no creature fit to live should be sent there, they only remark calmly that prisons are not
meant to be comfortable; which is no doubt the consideration that reconciled Pontius Pilate to the
practice of crucifixion.").
160 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law, Litigation 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976); Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV. 428
(1977).
161 Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, DestabilizationRights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1018 (2004).
162 Sabel, supra note 161, at 1021.
ERNMENT,
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conduct in the decree"; 163 and (3) "a strong directive role for the court or a special master in the formulation of remedial norms." 164 In short, the "commandand-control" approach mandates certain actions for the defendant and monitors
compliance. Substantial concerns emerged regarding the judicial competence to
oversee operation of complex, executive branch institutions when confronted
with opposing armies of experts arrayed by plaintiffs and defendants. 165 Courts
initially embraced three guiding principles: (1) the response must be one chosen
from professionally approved strategies; 166 (2) implementation must commit suf167
ficient resources to carry out the chosen strategy effectively and responsibly;
and (3) performance will be judged on the outcome. Implicit in this arrangement
is the notion that if the strategy chosen fails
to produce the anticipated outcome,
1 68
then the strategy will have to be changed.

Over several decades, courts learned the limitations of command-and-control
orders that freeze the parties' adversarial roles and lack the flexibility or capacity
to address new factors, such as unintended consequences or sabotage by front
line administrators. As a result, system change methodology has shifted away
from the command-and-control approach. More recently, commentators have
characterized system change judges as employing a "catalyst" approach, 169 engaging in an "experimentalist" approach,1 70 or creating "destabilization rights"
163 Id. at 1021-22.
164 Id. at 1022.
165 In the context of responding to egregious cases of educational failure, courts have articulated varying standards for defining what "sound and effective professional practice" might mean.
These include: Castenada v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981) (sound educational theory or legitimate experimental strategy); U.S. v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405, 420 (E.D. Texas 1981) (defendant's
program must be an "equally effective alternative" to that sought by plaintiffs); Martin Luther King
Jr. Elementary Sch. Children v. Mich. Bd of Educ., 473 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (best available knowledge); Nicholson v. Pittenger, 364 F. Supp 669, 675 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (violation of size, scope
and quality requirements where programs were approved without an evaluation to determine program effectiveness).
166 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). The court embraced "deference to the judgment
exercised by a qualified professional" noting that "liability may be imposed only when the decision by
the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or
standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a
judgment." Id. at 322-23. See also Soc'y for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239,
1248-49 (2d Cir. 1984); Sabel & Simon, supra note 161, at 1056 (discussing the changing role of professionals in formulating remedies).
167 See Nicholson, 364 F. Supp. at 675 (finding violations of size, scope and quality requirements where programs were approved without an evaluation to determine program effectiveness).
168 Gomez v. I11.
State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1041 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[jludicial deference
to the school system is unwarranted if over a certain period the system has failed to make substantial
progress in correcting the language deficiencies of its students").
169 Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of JudicialIntervention in Prisons,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 856-59 (1990).
170 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 161, at 1055 ("The judge's role changes from that of directly
determining the merits to facilitating a process of deliberation and negotiation among stakeholders.").
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which open the door to stakeholders in an ongoing participatory process.

Rather than imposing a static order from above, recent intervention takes the
form of a "rolling-rule regime" where rules are regarded as provisional and subject to a continuous, transparent process of reassessment and revision. 172 New
stakeholders can intervene, negotiations are deliberative, and the goal is to reach
consensus. Representation of diverse stakeholders has proven critical in a rollingrule regime because such cases typically entail political resistance to reforms that
respond to the interests of a vulnerable, stigmatized minority.17 3 The creation of

"destabilization rights" through an ongoing "rolling rule" remedy that permits
stakeholders to intervene could reverberate throughout the "web" of juvenile justice authorities;1 74 and thereby reduce their insulation from accountability. Our

hope is that emergence of a legal obligation to make use of the knowledge available will operate as an incentive, not a threat, to accrue new knowledge so the
"rolling rule" regime also initiates an ongoing journey of exploration and
learning.
CONCLUSION

We submit that the initial set of demands for reduction of disproportionate
minority contact should commence with the query: What response would be ac-

corded a white juvenile who had committed the same offense? There is no excuse
for continuing to treat youth of color as "throw-away people. ' 175 And this is just
171 "Destabilization induces the institution to reform itself in a process in which it must respond to previously excluded stakeholders." Sabel & Simon, supra note 161, at 1056.
Destabilization usefully describes both the remedy and the process by which the meaning of
the background substantive right is articulated in these cases. In the new public law, the judge
does not exercise discretion in each case to choose among an infinite array of potential responses to the particular problem. Rather, having found a violation of some broad norm-the
right to an adequate education, the right to access to justice-she imposes the single remedy
that the liability phase has shown to be appropriate: institutional destabilization. This remedy
has a common structure across fields. Moreover, judicially and publicly accountable standard-setting in the experimentalist liability phase bridges the gulf between the initial affirmation of the substantive right and the eventual remedy.
Id.
172 Id. at 1068.
173 Id. at 1065. "The minority can be a racial group, as in some versions of the education,
housing, and police cases. Or it can be a group that has been socially stigmatized on the basis of
conduct or disposition, as with prisoners and mental health patients." Id.
174 Different entities are responsible for different parts of the juvenile justice system. Police,
probation offices, youth services, and courts play key decision-making roles. In addition, other agencies, such as the Medicaid agency, the department of mental health and the public school system,
provide critical resources needed for an effective remedy. The "rolling-rule regime" provides a vehicle
for enlisting all relevant parties. The design of a pre-litigation strategy is critical in securing their
involvement.
175 SNYDER, supra note 33. at 211. While the majority of delinquency cases are referred to
juvenile court by law enforcement, cases may also be referred by parents, schools, or probation of-
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the beginning. "Deliberate indifference" can yield an evolving national standard
for Equal Protection. In some states, the standard of intervention for white youth
may also be far below that which is attainable through co-production and
strength-based approaches. There is a new body of knowledge respecting alternatives to detention that engage both family and community that produce better
outcomes for all, but especially for youth
of color. It is time that officials were
1 76
obliged to make use of that knowledge.

ficers. Id. "[N]early half of all cases referred to juvenile court intake are handled informally." Id.
While many informal cases are dismissed, in others, "the juvenile voluntarily agrees to abide by specific conditions for a specific time period." Id.
176 We oppose limiting that obligation to only those programs that are "evidenced-based."
Youth Courts and wrap-around programs work. Verification and demonstrable effectiveness ought to
be sufficient, and there is still much to be said for common sense. After all, we knew that segregation
sent a message of inferiority long before doll tests were utilized to "prove" the stigma. Further delay
in utilizing what we know is unacceptable when it perpetuates injustice. Accord EDMOND CAHN, CONFRONTING INJUSTICE: THE EDMOND CAHN READER 329 (1966); Edmond N. Cahn, A Dangerous Myth
in the School Segregation Cases, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150 (1955).
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APPENDIX

Two

ROADS DIVERGE-PARALLEL TALES

This short hypothetical scenario presents two fictional, but representative sixteen year olds: Ian, who is Caucasian and Tyrone, who is African American.
Each protagonist in the parallel scenarios attends his neighborhood school in a
community where most people are of the same race as he.
These parallel tales begin with each protagonist starting a minor altercation at
his own school. Each fight results in a few thrown punches and bruised adolescent egos; the only bloodshed is from a minor cut to the young protagonist. By
design, the initial virtually identical incidents result in consequences that are as
different as black and white.

TWO TAKES DIVERGE-PARALLEL TALES
DECISION POINT IN
THE JUVENILE

IAN'S EXPERIENCE

TYRONE'S EXPERIENCE

JUSTICE PROCESS

PRE-ARREST
ERRANT
BEHAVIOR IS THE
SAME

Ian and two other young men
begin to argue and throw
punches. Only Ian has a
minor bleeding cut. No one
else is injured in any way.
Several other students stand
aroundjeering,

Tyrone and two other young

WHAT AUTHORITY

The School Nurse and College
Counselor are the first adults
to arrive on the scene. They
diffuse the crowd of students
and dispatch one to get the
Assistant Principal (AP).

The School Policeman1 is the

COMES TO
ADDRESS THE
SITUATION?

men being to argue and throw
punches. Only Tyrone has a
minor bleeding cut. No one
else is injured in any way.
Several other students stand
around jeering.
first adult to arrive on the

scene. He diffuses the crowd
of students and radios a report
of the incident to the precinct.

' This officer parks his marked
squad car by the school to
deter fighting and other
criminal behavior, such as
drug deals.
ONCE LAW
ENFORCEMENT IS
CONTACTED, WHAT
IS THE
ASSESSMENT?

Ian has stopped bleeding from
a minor cut by the time the
first adult arrives on the scene,

Tyrone has stopped bleeding

from a minor cut by the time
the first adult arrives on the
scene.
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INITIAL CONTACT
ARE CHARGES
BROUGHT?

The AP has been briefed by
the Counselor that Ian has
been out of sorts since his
other brother has just left town
to go to a drug treatment
program.3 The AP asks Ian
what happened and says that
since there is blood they must
call the police. The responding
officer preparespaperwork
over the phone and offers to
issue a citation for diversion
which must be picked up by
the child and parent within 24
hours.
' Ian's older brother was
busted for having 40 packets of
"powder" cocaine
hydrochloride in the basement.

The police officer looks at
Tyrone and asks, "Don't you
run with 'Smoke'? ' 2 The
police officer pushes other
students out of the way as he
handcuffs and guides Tyrone
out toward the patrol car. He
doesn't let Tyrone speak and
he says he knows Tyrone is a
troublemaker and he saw the
incident himself.
2

Smoke is an 18 year old. He

was just sentenced to prison
for 10+ years in a crackcocaine distribution case for
having 40 packets of crackcocaine.

PRE-PETITION
How

ARE FIRST-

TIME OFFENDERS
TREATED?

The AP tries to reach Ian's
mother, whose phone is out of
service. Ian is then permitted
to try to reach another adult
relative. He calls his cousin to
get his aunt's telephone
number. Ian is still permitted
to go home. When his mother
gets home he tells her that she
must to go to retrieve the
citation. Later that night Ian's
mother goes to the police
station to pick up the citation
directing Ian to report to Court
two weeks later, on a Saturday.

Tyrone asks to go to his locker
to get his aunt's work number
because his mother cannot
receive calls at work during
her afternoon shift. The
officer refuses and orders
Tyrone, "to shut up or I'll shut
you up," as he pushes Tyrone
into the squad car to go down
to the station for his first
booking.
When Tyrone's mother arrives
at home after work, Tyrone is
not there. Tyrone's friends tell
her what happened to Tyrone
and she quickly goes to the
neighborhood police station to
pick him up. Tyrone is not
there and no one can tell her
where he is being held or
when his case might be in
court.
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INITIAL HEARING
IN RE GAULT
ENTITLES
JUVENILES TO
LEGAL
REPRESENTATION.

WHAT HAPPENS
WHEN THE

YOUTH

GOES TO COURT?

A lawyer calls Ian's home a
few days later. Ian and his
lawyer meet so the lawyer can
ascertain the facts, possible
witnesses and develop a
defense while the incident is
still fresh. The lawyer
encourages Ian to mind the
release order and to follow all
of the rules so that he can
persuade the court to order Ian
into a diversion program.

Tyrone meets his lawyer for
the first time, in open court

Ian arrives at court with his
mother and uncle, on a
Saturday about two weeks after
his arrest. The case gets
referred to diversion for first
offenders and they do not
appear before the judge. They
complete paperwork shortly
after they arrive at court and
are able to leave court less
than an hour after they get
there.

Tyrone gets to court the day

when he is brought out from
the lock-up cell behind the

judge's bench. His appointed
counsel did not come to meet
him before his afternoon court
appearance and instead starts
whispering some basic
questions like, "Is anyone in
court for you?"

after his arrest. He is alone,
sleepless, scared, disheveled,
and hungry. He has not
talked with his mother, any
other family member, or with
his lawyer. Tyrone is bought
out to the counsel table in
handcuffs. The lawyer defers
to the court social services and
the prosecutor's
recommendation for Tyrone to
be held in a halfway house or
group home because he seems
unsupervised and no adult has
come forward to speak on his
behalf. Tyrone tries, to no
avail, to explain that the
police did not permit him to
call anyone.
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WHAT HAPPENS
AFTER THE FIRST
COURT
APPEARANCES?

Ian goes home. He continues
to act out on occasion, but has
been chastened by the
diversion agreement that he
and his mother signed at the
courthouse. The agreement
requires Ian to meet all of the
conditions, including getting a
summer job and staying out of
trouble for an entire year. If
Ian meets all of the conditions
in the diversion agreement, he
will not even have an arrest
record.

All of the community halfway
houses are full so Tyrone gets
sent to a youth detention
facility. He is incarcerated on
a ward with about twenty
other juvenile detainees where
he gets into altercations and
disagreements with staff and
bunk mates. Tyrone has
talked with his mom a couple
of times by phone, but she has
been unable to visit due to
transportation issues.
When Tyrone returns to court
for his status hearing two
weeks later, he has "earned" a
number of infractions.
Tyrone's attorney, whom he
has not seen since the initial
hearing/arraignment, directs
him to enter a guilty plea and
he does. Tyrone is adjudicated
"involved"; the judge commits
Tyrone to the Department of
Youth Services, which decides
to keep him locked up for
another month or two, or until
a group home slot opens up.
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DURING THE FIRST SIX MOTHS AFTER INITIAL INCIDENT
WHAT HAPPENS
POST-DISPOSITION?

Ian finds a part time job at the
local pizza shop and tries not
to let his temper flare.
Although Ian does not get any
new contacts during the first
six months he is on diversion,
he begins to slide about six
months later. His volatile
temper results in Ian getting
fired from his job, which
places him out of compliance
with the diversion program.
Ian's citation is filed, he gets
officially charged, and a notice
sent to his home orders him to
appear on the following
Saturday. Since Ian has not
gotten rearrested, when he goes
before the judge he enters a
guilty plea for the initialfight
case and is placed on
probation. His only condition
is that he complete an
afterschool SAT Prep program
and report to the probation
office six months later with a
certificate of completion.

Tyrone eventually gets into a
group home near the rival
high school; he is happy to be
back in the community and no
longer locked up.
Due to overcrowding in the
system, particularly in
community-based group home,
Tyrone is released a mere ten
days later and returned home
under several conditions of
aftercare (the juvenile
equivalent of parole). Tyrone
must report weekly to his
aftercare worker, submit to
drug tests, go to a monthly
anger management meeting at
the probation officer and he is
ordered to find a summer job.
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WHEN THERE IS
SUBSEQUENT BAD
CONDUCT, HOW
DOES THE SYSTEM
RESPOND?

Although Ian completes the
SAT Prep program he has
several additional disciplinary
reports at school and gets more
and more out of control. His
school counselor signs him up
for an art therapy program
designed to tackle his anger
management issues. This
begins to make a difference.
He also meets a girl in the
program who is a good
influence on his study habits
and overall behavior.
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During his first month home,
Tyrone reports religiously for
his aftercare appointments
where he submits urine
samples and "tests clean"
indicating no drug use or
exposure. Tyrone tries in vain
to find a summer job. It
seems like the first question
on each application is:
Whether he has been arrested
and found guilty. After he
answers that question, "yes,"
he does not get called back.
The next two times that
Tyrone shows up his aftercare
worker is either absent or
unavailable. When Tyrone
finds out there are no
consequences for failing to
find a job or for failing to
check in with his aftercare
worker (although it is her
fault), he slackens on
attendance at the weekly
appointments and falls back
into his old patterns and
activities. He goes to a party
one Saturday night and hangs
out in a room where his
friends are smoking marijuana.
The next week, his aftercare
worker calls and orders him to
come in or risk getting locked
up. Tyrone believes that he
will test dirty for drug use so
he refuses to go to the
appointment. The system
records are also unclear from
the group home. A bench
issues for Tyrone's arrest. The
school officer is notified and
the next day Tyrone is
arrested coming out of school.
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Tyrone refuses to submit to a
drug test and is held pending
an aftercare revocation
hearing. When he appears
before the judge, Tyrone is
told that he will be held in
confinement for another six
months to teach him a lesson.
EIGHTEEN MONTHS AFTER ADJUDICATION
WHAT HAS
HAPPENED
EIGHTEEN MONTHS
AFTER
ADJUDICATION?

Due to his continued bad
temper, Ian lost his job at the
local pizza parlor and his
chance at diversion is taken
away. When his case his
reinstated, the court places Ian
on probation with the sole
conditions that he stay out of
trouble and complete the after
school SAT Prep course. Ian
had some technical violations
while on probation because he
continued to get into disputes
and altercations. Ian's
probation does not get
revoked. He accesses
community-based services and
participates in an art therapy
program that actually helps
him cope better. While in the
program, he befriends a young
lady with whom he enjoys
spending afternoons studying
and starts managing his time
and temper better.

During the same eighteenmonth period, Tyrone was
incarcerated first in detention
and then in commitment status
pending an opening in a group
home. When he eventually
got home, he could not find a
job, and did not get any other
helpful services. Once he
realized that the
recordkeeping at the aftercare
office was lax, he stopped
going and began to hang out
with the "wrong crowd" again.
Although he has no new
charges, some technical
violations result in Tyrone
being locked up again.

These parallel tales depict the many points in the classic juvenile delinquency
incident where disparate decisions will result in vastly different outcomes. Although Ian and Tyrone are similarly predisposed to have volatile tempers, the
consequences are very different. The system offers alternatives, resources and a
measure of grace to permit Ian to overcome his temper problem and to develop
coping skills. On the other hand, Tyrone, like so many before him, becomes one
more statistical casualty - one swept into the "cradle to prison pipeline." Disparity with a racial bias element is present in every phase of the juvenile justice
system, but the decision at the point of the initial contact regarding whether to
divert, prosecute, detain, or employ an alternative to detention is the most critical
in the eyes of many scholars.

